The general as spokesman

The Democratic Party's willingness to embrace anyone and everyone who both wore a uniform and disagrees with American strategy in Iraq reached its apogee of absurdity with the embrace of retired Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez this past weekend. If a party wishes to criticize the conduct of a war, as is its right and arguably its duty as long as that criticism is intended to fix problems in national policy, then it is probably not a good idea to draft a man responsible for many of our major mistakes as your spokesman.

Lt. Gen. Sanchez will forever be indelibly linked to the stupidity of 2003-04 that ensured Iraq would not be a quick American victory. Along with Paul Bremer, who was his civilian counterpart, Sanchez dismantled the Iraqi army without providing for replacement security forces, erased almost the entire state apparatus and radically de-Baathified the government, and presided over the forces responsible for the Abu Ghraib fiasco. Heavy-handed American responses and an unwillingness to engage the local population were also hallmarks of the U.S. effort during his tenure at the top. In short, Sanchez helped lay the groundwork necessary for the emergence of the Iraqi insurgency that later helped spark a limited civil war.

This is not to say that he bears all the blame for these massive strategic errors. It is not Sanchez's fault that the Bush administration so completely failed to fully think through its course of action after major combat operations were over. It is only half Sanchez's fault that he and Paul Bremer failed to unite all aspects of American power into a national strategy for victory. It is also not his fault that, as many in the army and in Congress pointed out at the time, there were never enough troops in the country to secure it.

But it is his fault that everything he did try failed so spectacularly. It is not enough for a leader to argue that political concerns have hamstrung American efforts and that our political class cares more about winning elections than it does about winning the war. That may be true, but a three-star general in command of over 150,000 troops is not some green private without discretion. Sanchez was the commander of American forces during a crucial period of this war, when even a partial embrace of classical counterinsurgency doctrine would have paid huge dividends. Instead, he followed policies that he now admits were fatally flawed.

What makes the decision to embrace Sanchez so mystifying is that, if asked to trust either a commander who failed or a commander who seems to have found a successful strategy, the Democrats are asking us to trust the one who failed. Most Americans are more likely to listen to Gen. David Petraeus GS '87. Whatever one thinks about both men, and I have the utmost respect for anyone who dedicates their entire life to serving our country in uniform, the fact is that things have gotten much better on Petraeus' watch but got much worse while Sanchez commanded.

The Petraeus strategy of sticking combat outposts in the middle of dangerous neighborhoods and focusing on population protection, not force protection, has brought violence down at least 50 percent. The Sanchez-Rumsfeld strategy of staying in huge bases and focusing on massive counter-terrorist sweeps failed miserably. Perhaps Sanchez's background in armored warfare, where the emphasis is and always has been on massive tank battles, made him ill-suited for commanding the fight against a relatively low intensity insurgency. Petraeus, on the other hand, has always been a light infantry officer, and infantry patrols, often on foot and in small groups, have become a key to reducing violence.

Sanchez and the Democrats he spoke for are, in effect, asking us to turn our backs on the only set of tactics that have shown any promise for lasting success. By reducing violence, allowing reconciliation on a local level and setting the stage for national reconciliation, Petraeus has made a comprehensive victory possible. Yes, there has not yet been a Nobel peace prizewinning handshake in the Iraqi version of the Rose Garden. I would argue, however, that to expect instant resolution and settlement of complex issues the moment violence subsides is unrealistic. Petraeus has already proven the skeptics wrong once by restoring a modicum of security and stability: We shouldn't abandon his efforts to do the impossible twice by bringing lasting peace, especially not because of the words of a failed former commander. Barry Caro is a history major from White Plains, N.Y. He can be reached at bcaro@princeton.edu.