Darfur: An alternate history

In the spring of 2004, President Bush faced a serious dilemma. Since being elected to office, he had been instrumental in fostering a peace between the North and South in civil war-ravaged Sudan. Yet just as a legitimate peace between these factions finally seemed within reach, a separate conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan caught the attention of the international community. It soon became apparent that Arab janjaweed militias in the region were systematically burning villages, raping women and killing civilians with the backing and blessing of President Omar al-Bashir's government.

Hundreds of thousands had been displaced by the summer, and it was clear that despite talks with Khartoum and the placement of African Union peacekeepers in the region, Darfurians still were not safe. People were still dying, directly and indirectly as a result of bombardment from the skies and pillaging by horseback.

Military intervention, effective as it might have been, seemed unlikely. Having already come under intense criticism when no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, the Bush administration was aware that the prospect of sending troops to another Islamic state with oil did not sit well with the American people or the rest of the world.

But there was an important distinction to be made in this case. After threatening Sudan with sanctions and dispatching Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Darfur region in late June to assess the situation, Bush witnessed both the House and Senate pass resolutions calling the conflict in Darfur what it was: genocide. What eagerness may have pervaded the Capitol in July 2004 soon melted away. As the deaths continued in the first half of 2005, Bush was completely silent on Darfur. His administration then began to actively oppose and undermine any efforts to intervene there. Sometimes I can't help but wonder what a little effort on the President's part in the summer of 2004 and beyond might have accomplished. So here is one version of what history might have looked like if we had done what we could have done, and, some might argue, we should have done at this crucial juncture:

The United States could have easily backed away from its courageous stance and downplayed the reports of atrocities in Darfur in the name of political expediency. Instead, the President deftly incorporated his proposed response to genocide into his vision for American involvement abroad. As he told the American people in a special television address on Darfur, if America and the rest of the world were to truly achieve peace and secure freedom across the globe, then the most sinister and vile affront to freedom — the deliberate and systematic theft of existence — would have to be confronted and eliminated wherever and whenever it cropped up.

The President spent the rest of that summer and fall not allowing anyone to forget the horror that was transpiring in Darfur. In speech after speech, Bush elevated the crisis to global proportions, repeatedly citing the failure of the world to respond as one million Tutsis were speedily and savagely murdered in Rwanda ten years before. Media organizations couldn't help but cover these appeals, and the American public couldn't help but take notice.

Taking a page right out of "A Problem from Hell," Samantha Power's brilliant historical analysis of the (lacking) American response to genocide in the 20th century, Bush effectively tackled the paradox of political will. Too often human rights activists had been told by politicians reluctant to act to "make more noise" if they wanted action to be taken. But this was a circular argument. Most constituents wouldn't typically hear or care about even the most abominable global crimes unless these issues were raised and reiterated again and again by their political leaders. Bush broke this vicious cycle of excuses by making Darfur his priority, thereby making it our priority.

Bolstered by a ground swell of public support, the United States acted, first appealing to the U.N., then to NATO. Confronting genocide in a meaningful way meant committing a not-so-small contingent of US troops to Darfur in late 2004 to participate in multinational peacekeeping activities. Yes, we bore casualties in Darfur, but we remained resolute, convinced that the cause of protecting civilians who would have otherwise faced certain death was both just and in America's interest. Next month we will witness the next step toward securing a more just world, as the United States will host ambassadors from every member state in the U.N. at the landmark Conference to Eradicate Genocide in New York.

In a few short months back in 2004, it became apparent to the American public, to the murderous Khartoum regime and to the rest of the world that when Bush said "Not on my watch" in response to President Clinton's ineptitude during the Rwandan genocide, he really meant it. Thanks to President Bush's efforts, it is likely that tens, if not hundreds of thousands of lives were saved in Darfur, all because he chose to make genocide the issue it ought to be. In doing so, he ensured that no one would ever call this president a wimp on genocide. Freddie LaFemina is a history major from North Massapequa, N.Y. He can be reached at lafemina@princeton.edu.