The missing dimension: reflections on the divestment from Egypt

Reading through the divestment referendum that the undergraduates have already voted on and the graduate students are due to vote on in the course of this week, I was utterly shocked that Egypt was included in the referendum. Moreover, an article published a few weeks ago in The Daily Princetonian and written by supporters of this movement has provided a one-sided narrative about divestment from Egypt. As an Egyptian who was born, raised and lived there for 23 years, I feel compelled to provide another narrative to my fellow Princetonians. The fact that the article began by talking about the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi made me wonder about the relevance of this event to the goals of the divestment. What I recall from the relatively short period that Mohammed Morsi governed is his collaboration with and invitation of Hamas leaders to Cairo. It did not come as a surprise to me as Hamas has been established in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Khaled Meshal, who is currently its chairman, is now residing in Qatar, a country that has been strongly supporting Hamas along with Saudi Arabia and Iran. It remains unclear to me and many other observers what Mohammed Morsi’s intentions were in collaborating with Hamas.

Speaking of history, the 1978 Camp David Accords were a great success for Egypt and improved relations between the Egyptian and Israeli governments. Unfortunately, Egypt paid an extensive price for this peace treaty with Israel, culminating in the suspension of Egypt’s membership in the Arab League that was not lifted until 1989. Moreover, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad assassinated President Anwar El Sadat on October 6,1981, and the mother of the killer, Khaled Al-Islambouli,says she is still proud of her son, citing the Camp David Accords as a betrayal for the Islamic nation. Yusuf Sibai, who was the Egyptian minister of culture, was assassinated on February 18,1978 by the Abu Nidal Organization, a militant Palestinian group, because he supported and accompanied Anwar El Sadat during his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. In opposing the Camp David Accords, Islamist organizations in a variety of forms have worked hard to destabilize Egypt because the accords were seen as a betrayal for the Palestinian and Islamic cause, though Egypt has always been involved in mediating truces and negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Since the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the Sinai Peninsula has become a war zone between the Egyptian military and various terrorist organizations. The situation has worsened tremendously after the ousting of Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Concerning the Sinai Insurgency, out of the approximately 15 main militant groups operating in the Sinai desert, the most active militant groups have relations with the Gaza Strip. The Army of Islam, based in the Tzabra neighborhood of the Gaza Strip, is responsible for training many militant organizations and jihadist members in Sinai. The Army of Islam smuggles members into the Gaza Strip for training, then returns them to the Sinai Peninsula to engage in terrorist activities. This is just an example of the terrorist organizations operating in the border region between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

The most disturbing transformation in 2014 is that elements of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House) group claimed allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and proclaimed themselves as the “Sinai Province,”and the grip of these terrorist organizations is only growing in the Sinai region. Moreover, offshoots of the Islamic State are spreading across Egypt and other countries in North Africa. Taking these events into account, it came to my surprise the superficiality and the simplicity of the rhetoric posed by the divestment campaigners that does not take into account the complexity of the Egyptian situation. The Princeton Divests Coalition prides itself for educating the campus about the Palestinian issue while the involvement of terrorist organizations in Egyptian-Palestinian relations has not been addressed. Can one implicitly speculate that the divestment campaigners assume that removing the Egyptian blockade on Gaza will ameliorate the lives of the Egyptians and Palestinians? I urge the divestment campaigners to be more explicit about this overlooked facet of the debate. Rather, it is naïve to think that lifting the blockade on Gaza will prompt the armed terrorist groups to give up their arms and beliefs in the total annihilation of Israel and in harming Egyptian interests. Though the evidence presented above may appear detailed and fragmented, this was done intentionally to show that, in an academic institution such as ours, it is highly important to contextualize any political move and to look at the ideological nuances that sometimes pass unnoticed. I do not claim that this is the whole story and I do not claim that the Egyptian government is clear of responsibilities, but I just wanted to bring to attention the missing dimension that the divestment campaigners have systematically avoided discussing or have tagged as irrelevant. Last but not least, political ideologies matter and one should be mindful of what values he or she is supporting without being affected by emotionally charged slogans and campaigns, especially as the graduate student body votes on this issue in the coming days.

Ahmed El Hady is a postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton Neuroscience Institute from Cairo, Egypt. He can be reached atahady@princeton.edu.