About one year ago the U.S. and Iraqi governments shifted strategies in Iraq. More than just a troop surge, the new counter-insurgency strategy radically changed our presence and mission; whereas once we sat in massive compounds with most of our forces safely "behind the wire," we now aggressively patrol the streets and neighborhoods of Iraq. This has curbed the violence and ended the downward spiral of 2006. In light of this new reality, the question before us - the question none of the three remaining presidential candidates has really answered - is how do we turn temporary success into lasting victory?
The question is especially pertinent in light of past weeks' fighting between the Iraqi government and Shiite militia forces, trained and outfitted partially by Iran, under the loose command of Moqtada al-Sadr. When the surge was announced, I wrote a column saying in part that the struggle against Sadr would be the most difficult and complex of the six interlocking struggles in Iraq. While success in the fight against al-Qaeda or the Baathist insurgency is a welcome though unsecured development, a victory for Sadr and Iran in this first arena would undo all other progress.
Faced with its persistent lack of control over some Shiite areas of Iraq, the country's government had three alternatives. It could simply have accepted the situation. But no government can be legitimate if it lacks a monopoly on force within its own borders; this is, after all, part of what defines a government. This left the Iraqi government with two ways to reassert its sovereignty: negotiations or military force. It chose to strongly emphasize force.
The government opted for force because there has always been doubt about whether Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would have the stomach to order a crackdown on Shiite extremists. This operation was partially designed to make clear that no one could subvert the authority of the national government. Sadr and the other extremists would control any negotiations if they believed that the government was unwilling to fight: They could simply threaten to walk out and put their militias into the streets, giving them a de facto veto. The assault on and re-occupation of downtown Basra removed this trump card from the insurgents' deck. The Iraqi government, with significant and vital help from U.S. airpower, artillery, special forces and intelligence, used force as a means to break a political stalemate. This is a good illustration of Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other means."
After a week of fighting, Sadr preemptively ordered his militia to lay down its arms and let the Iraqi army into his strongholds without getting any guarantee that his demands would be met. Unilateral withdrawal from an ongoing battle is generally not a sign of success. Today the Iraqi army is asserting control over areas that it couldn't have set foot in two weeks ago. Corrupt local police have been replaced by the national army throughout much of the South. Now that the logjam has been broken, negotiations have begun again but on very different terms than before. That is progress.
Is this approach the right one to Iraq? To some extent the answer is yes because the central government cannot continue to be impotent, but the precedent is also a dangerous one. Clausewitz's dictum is not supposed to apply to settling internal issues. While the targeted use of force worked here, it is not a recipe for lasting security on its own.
Similarly, attempts at negotiation without the threat of force have proven that talk is not enough. An obsession with negotiations can lead us to check our principles at the door to ensure access. While some think this cost is worth it, I'm skeptical of the belief that we should sell our souls for dialogue and that negotiations are always the best option, especially because compromise is impossible when neither side will sell at any price.
While we deplore the necessity of violence, the point is that it was necessary to ensure the possibility of lasting change. The goal has always been to use our forces to create a sustainable democracy, and so Maliki's method is the right one as long as it's applied in moderation and not indefinitely as the situation changes. While U.S. politicians seem to grasp some of the new reality, there is disturbing evidence that they are immune to reality a la President Bush. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) sometimes confuses Sadr (a Shiite) with al-Qaeda (Sunni), and the two Democrats are sticking with the get-out-now rhetoric of 2007 despite the changes since. This is the 3 a.m. phone call - will any of them pick up?
Barry Caro is a history major from White Plains, N.Y. He can be reached at bcaro@princeton.edu.
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