The insurgencies and the surge

I don't know for certain whether or not the "surge" of combat troops into Iraq is going to work. The military axiom, "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy," seems especially relevant in the confusing maelstrom that is Iraq. With that said, there are several reasons to be optimistic about the prospects for success of this effort.

On a tactical level, our effort appears sound. General David Petraeus GS'85 wrote the United States' new counterinsurgency doctrine based largely on his copious experiences in Iraq. We can therefore expect a large-scale shift to tactics that have shown promise, such as embedding American troops in Iraq units and building small "forts" at key locations within cities. This is not "more of the same" and, combined with changes in our rules of engagement, represents a profound readjustment in how we are fighting the insurgents.

The potential impact of these changes is compounded by the complex nature of our enemies in Iraq. There are at least six different, though connected, conflicts currently ongoing in Iraq, and the consequences of our actions will not be the same in every arena. In order to analyze the effect of the surge one has to look at these battles individually.

Our smallest foe by the numbers, but greatest in impact, is Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Qaeda is supported by Syria and employs many foreign fighters. This Sunni group is responsible for a majority of the high profile suicide bombings and acts of mass murder — such as last February's attack on the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra — that set the stage for the current chaos. These martyrs-to-be cannot be reasoned or bargained with and will not go away with an American withdrawal; they can only be killed lest they establish an Iraqi Taliban on the Tigris. Because the surge appears to have caused Al Qaeda's commander to order a preemptive retreat from Baghdad, it must be seen as partially successful already.

The remains of the Baath party and Hussein loyalists are the other entirely Sunni elements of the insurgency. This group has been seriously damaged in four years of fighting and is no longer a dominant force within Iraq. It is unclear what effect the surge will have on these fighters. They are staunchly anti-American and will likely be inflamed by more foreign troops, but they are comparatively rational and may be coerced into the democratic process if they can be convinced that armed resistance is futile.

If those two parts of the insurgency can be brought under control, the United States stands a good chance of solving the ongoing sectarian civil war. Without the provocations of Al Qaeda and the Baath there will be fewer atrocities for Shiite death squads to avenge, which will in turn give Sunnis less reason to retaliate. Iraq's army must then maintain a buffer between the extremists on either side to ensure that violence does not flare back up, but if the reality follows the plan then widespread bloodshed can be sharply reduced. The fourth part of the insurgency — general criminal activity — should decline sharply if the chaos it feeds off declines.

If the rest of the country can be brought under greater control one part of the conflict should abate: Kurdish separatists. Much, if not all, of the violence in the north of Iraq is related to Kurdish efforts to slowly establish an independent state. Without widespread anarchy elsewhere, Kurdish dreams of sovereignty will have to be expressed within a unified Iraq. That is vitally important, as full independence means a war between two U.S. allies (Turkey and the Kurds).

That still leaves the most complex issue unsolved — that of Iranian-aligned Shiite militias. I have no idea whatsoever what effect the surge and the concurrent crackdown on sectarian militias is going to have on groups like the Mahdi Army. The results here will also be based on what happens with Iran's nuclear program, and there are simply too many variables for me to make an intelligent estimate of how these groups will react.

Opponents of the surge often like to point out that "there can be no military solution." While technically correct, this fails to consider that there can be no political solution in the current security environment. Give me a realistic proposal for solving the violence, and I'll listen. But in the absence of credible alternatives, this plan seems to be the best option for calming the situation to a point where reconciliation can occur. Barry Caro is a sophomore from White Plains, N.Y. He may be reached at bcaro@princeton.edu.