As we in the counterterrorism community surveyed Ground Zero in New York and the smoldering south face of the Pentagon on Sept. 12, 2001, few thought five years would pass without another major terrorist attack in the United States. Indeed, many predicted worse: an NCBR (nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological) attack as the next episode in a grim series. The fears were well-founded and had real effects — a massive consolidation of homeland security, a far-reaching reordering of intelligence and funding for first responders. Throughout Washington and in embassies abroad, counterterrorism was put at the top of "to do" lists.
Five years on, those fears have not been realized, and the American way of life, while impacted in significant ways, has not been fundamentally altered. People work in skyscrapers, take planes and go about their business in Washington — inconvenienced to be sure by escalated security measures — but much as they did before 9/11. This relative normalcy is a measure, perhaps the most significant measure, of tentative success in the "War on Terror."
How was this success achieved and, more importantly, what must be done to maintain it? Based on my experience of U.S. counterterrorism efforts prior to 9/11 and post-9/11, I offer the following thoughts.
First, don't conflate threats
One of the many services performed by the report of the 9/11 Commission was to determine beyond reasonable doubt the perpetrators of 9/11 — i .e. Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization. It also clarified who was not responsible: Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath regime in Iraq. While that distinction was clear to counterterrorism professionals all along, the Bush administration tragically linked the issues and continues to do so. Similarly, during the Cold War, U.S. administrations defined the enemy broadly and unhelpfully as "Communism." Yet, Tito was not Stalin. China was not the USSR. Vietnam was not East Germany. The President continues to speak of Islamic fascism and equates success in Iraq with success in counterterrorism in a way that conflates threats and confuses priorities. In his threat assessment for Congress, the Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte has provided a much more practical and honest hierarchy of threats that allows for a reasonable priority of efforts: first and foremost, al Qaeda, its affiliates and self-starting cells inspired by its program.
No sanctuaries
Al Qaeda success in East Africa, in Yemen and ultimately in the United States owed much to its sanctuary in Afghanistan which permitted it to recruit, train, plan and equip competent operatives. The elimination of that sanctuary in Operation Enduring Freedom more than any other single measure explains al Qaeda's inability to repeat 9/11. Judging from bin Laden's recent statements, the triumph of jihad in that one country remains his priority while actions on other fronts are encouraged and applauded. The United States has much at stake in NATO's efforts to help the elected Afghan government secure and develop its country. Moreover, al Qaeda efforts to create new sanctuaries, e.g. in Yemen, must continue to be frustrated ideally in partnership with the government and people in those countries. And now that al Qaeda has established itself in Iraq, the United States has a vital interest in providing the Iraqi government the wherewithal to prevent al Qaeda establishing a safe haven there.
No network
Beyond its sanctuary, al Qaeda's effectiveness derived from a worldwide network of fund raisers, document forgers, facilitators and safe houses. The U.S.-led international campaign following 9/11 significantly disrupted that network. In Yemen, for example, we saw major al Qaeda operatives frustrated in attempts to mount operations or support the families of mujahiddin for lack of funds. Significantly, post-9/11 terrorist attacks or plots — in Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005 and again in London in 2006 — have been essentially local initiatives. As such, they have been less potent and possibly more susceptible to disruption than the al Qaeda-organized attacks in East Africa, Yemen and the United States. Indeed "homegrown" terrorists, especially from the Islamic communities in Europe, have now become our most immediate, if not most potent, threat as Steve Simon and Dan Benjamin point out in "The Next Attack." Local counter-terrorist experts in London and New York have done well to garner cooperation or intelligence in these communities. U.S. diplomats, law enforcers, intelligence agents and military must continue to make common cause with our many allies internationally to frustrate the reemergence of bin Laden's "base."
Resolving conflicts
Mujahhidin rage is fueled first and foremost by rejection of foreign occupation — in Iraq, in the Palestinian territories, in Kashmir and elsewhere. In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most salient motivator. In the 1970s and 1980s, active U.S. diplomacy led to cease fires and peace agreements that are still respected by Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In the 1990s, diplomacy faltered, and negotiated agreements between the Palestinians and Israel were not respected by either side. Since then, Israeli unilateralism — i.e., withdrawal from Lebanon under Hezbollah pressure and withdrawal from Gaza under Hamas pressure — has greatly strengthened militant movements while undermining moderates. At the same time, America's increasing alignment with Israel and spurning of difficult Arab parties like Syria has greatly reduced its ability to conduct effective diplomacy as evidenced by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's frustrated shuttles this summer to deal with Lebanon. For stability in the Middle East and to drain the passion which inspires extremism, the United States must go beyond support of Israel to balance its interests, broaden its contacts and help the parties move away from violence and unilateralism and back to negotiations.
Democratization
In his second inaugural, President Bush linked success in counterterrorism to the democratization of the Middle East. Rice subsequently compared this challenge to the transformation of post-World War II Europe. And yet, in the Middle East of today, liberal, democratic forces are notably weak. In the Palestinian territories, Hamas triumphed in free and fair elections. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has converted its political support among Shia enhanced — by the recent conflict — into a decisive voice in that government. In Egypt, only the Muslim Brotherhood represents a serious challenge to the ruling party. Democratization efforts in the Middle East should not be based on a vision in Washington or a shaky historical analogy with Eastern Europe. Instead, democratization there should be based on the aspirations of peoples of the region, e.g. as expressed in the Arab Human Development Reports or international practices of good governance as documented by the World Bank. Realistically, we should anticipate change over generations and work through the National Democratic Institute or Middle East Partnership Initiative with a long view.
Human rights and rule of law
In the wake of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, violations of human rights and rule of law have undermined American influence. Abu Gharib and Guantanamo have put the United States at odds with the Muslim world and much of the international community. Belatedly, the U.S. legislative and judicial branches have begun to address the real dilemma of respecting human rights while pursuing effective counterterrorism. The American law enforcement experts I have known believe these two interests can be reconciled. The American military also seems increasingly motivated to respect the silver rule: do not do unto enemy combatants what we would not have done to our own combatants. Congress needs to legislate an approach consistent with our Constitution and the Geneva Convention. Guantanamo prison, which has become the symbol of the United States flaunting its international obligations, should be shut down.
Define success realistically
Despite our best efforts in counterterrorism, in solving conflicts, in democratizing and in human rights, we should not expect a perfect record. By its very nature, asymmetrical conflict allows the weaker party to achieve tactical successes often with disproportionate political effect. We will not always know the when, the where and the how of future terrorist attacks. In my view, the question is not whether al Qaeda, its affiliates or its followers can perpetrate a successful attack against U.S. interests or even the U.S. homeland. The question is whether they can do so on a scale and with a frequency to disrupt seriously our way of life. George Kennan '25, Princeton's gift to American diplomacy, once defined national security as "the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers." With that as a reasonable goal and with the experience of the last five years, we need not be daunted by the way ahead. Edmund J. Hull '71, the second contributor in our expert series on policy options five years after 9/11, was the State Department's acting coordinator for counterterrorism until July 2001, and Ambassador to Yemen, 2001-2004. On Sept. 11, 2001, he was meeting at the Pentagon when it was attacked. He is currently diplomat-in-residence at the Wilson School.
Read More
Keep academic authority in human hands
Lily Halbert-AlexanderThe Trump administration’s attacks on research and higher education as well as a blind reliance on AI chatbots are reflective of a societal backslide: a commodification of knowledge that prioritizes “efficiency” over the messy process of getting to an answer, where nuances are flattened and the truth is fungible.
The Trump administration’s attacks on research and higher education as well as a blind reliance on AI chatbots are reflective of a societal backslide: a commodification of knowledge that prioritizes “efficiency” over the messy process of getting to an answer, where nuances are flattened and the truth is fungible.
What do we owe society for a Princeton education?
Jia Cheng ShenThe social and moral responsibility that comes with receiving a degree subsidized by both private generosity and public trust is significant.
The social and moral responsibility that comes with receiving a degree subsidized by both private generosity and public trust is significant.
Notes from a so-called enemy’s classroom
Jennifer JenningsIt wasn’t revolutionary. It was homework. But it was homework that asked: how do we build schools that work for all kids? Inclusion, after all, is the “I” in DEI. That’s what we’re thinking about together. And caring about each other’s experiences and opportunities, it turns out, isn’t something you can outlaw.
It wasn’t revolutionary. It was homework. But it was homework that asked: how do we build schools that work for all kids? Inclusion, after all, is the “I” in DEI. That’s what we’re thinking about together. And caring about each other’s experiences and opportunities, it turns out, isn’t something you can outlaw.