The capture of Saddam Hussein made headlines over the holidays but, for my money, the reappearance of Iraq's former leader is old news. What's really worth talking about, by contrast, is the almost terminal disappearance of Pakistan's current leader. General Pervez Musharraf recently dodged two separate assassination attempts, the last one a particularly audacious attack that killed fourteen bystanders. The capture of Saddam was a fabulous Christmas present for George Bush and Tony Blair, but it hasn't stalled the attacks of the Iraqi resistance or made American troops any safer. The assassination of Musharraf, on the other hand, is a truly calamitous prospect for the proponents of the "war on terrorism," and a distinct possibility given recent events.
Musharraf took power in Pakistan in a bloodless coup in 1999, replacing the democratically-elected but corrupt President Nawaz Sharif. While the general won praise from Western observers for his economic policies, his unapologetic support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan made him persona non grata in Washington. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, few world leaders were in a tighter spot than Musharraf: Forced by President Bush to choose between America and "the terrorists," the General agreed to help the United States in its war against the Taliban even though this war was immensely unpopular throughout Pakistan. Ever since, Musharraf has struggled to reconcile the demands of the Bush administration with the wishes of a domestic audience that has never given its support to his presidency. The recent assassination attempts suggest that the strain of this arrangement is greater than ever.
Musharraf's problem in Pakistan is a familiar one to observers of the Middle East, and it hangs menacingly over America's efforts to rebuild Iraq. Pakistan's secular but corrupt rulers, taking power through either the ballot box or a military coup, have sought to promote a "moderate" agenda but also to mollify radical Islamists. Meanwhile, these "moderate" leaders have employed Islamic fundamentalism as a cutting edge in the struggles with Pakistan's neighbors: in the disputed province of Kashmir, where Pakistan and India have been engaged in violent conflict for more than half a century; and in Afghanistan, where Pakistan sought first to expel the Soviet Union (with American help), and then to determine the winning party in the fratricidal chaos that followed the Russian defeat. Just as the CIA helped Osama bin Laden and his followers to develop a network in Afghanistan for waging jihad against the Soviets, so Pakistan's intelligence services encouraged radical Islamists both within and beyond Pakistan's borders.
Unelected leaders, already vulnerable to the charge that they lack legitimacy, have had a particularly difficult time navigating Islamist challenges. In the 1970s, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat began a delicate dance with that nation's fundamentalist groups, alternately repressing particular religious organizations, making donations to Islamic groups and amending Egypt's laws to reflect a more literal interpretation of Islam. In an attack that was reminiscent of the recent events in Pakistan, Sadat was ultimately assassinated in 1981 by an Islamist who had infiltrated the supposedly-secular military. In the face of this challenge Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, opted not to democratize Egypt but to continue the dangerous dance with religious groups: the Islamist movement in Egypt has subsequently become only more extreme in its political agenda. The same could be said for Saudi Arabia, another nation in which a ruling elite has made awkward accommodations with radical Islam to ensure its own survival. (Saudi Arabia contributed fifteen hijackers to the Sept. 11 attacks; Egypt produced the ringleader, Mohammed Atta.)
Musharraf, then, seems unlikely to stabilize Pakistan in the long term, and may fall into the same disastrous pattern that has plagued Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If yet another assassination attempt should succeed, meanwhile, the United States will face an unenviable choice between allowing the Islamist parties to govern their country or backing another strongman who will enjoy still less legitimacy than Musharraf. These are bad options, and Musharraf's continued rule without a popular mandate only postpones the moment at which they'll confront American policymakers.
From the examples of recent history, it's clear that political Islam is at least partly a response to repression and exclusion. While autocrats in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq could easily crack down on their political rivals, the mosques remained an oasis of deliberation and organizing for the surviving opponents of these regimes. Further repression, or the exclusion of radical groups from the democratic process, is only likely to exacerbate this religious turn. In Pakistan and Iraq, then, the United States should be encouraging a democratic process without prejudicing the outcome, even if this means that Islamist groups come to dominate the government. Failing this, the successors to Saddam and Musharraf will further radicalize their religious opponents and create still greater problems for Western governments in the future.
Nicholas Guyatt is a lecturer in the history department. He is from Bristol, England.
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