Mapping an end to the standoff with North Korea

With all the bad news emerging from North Korea over the past year, China's apparent cooperation with Washington to resolve the nuclear standoff has been both positive and even surprising to some. But China has many clear reasons behind its constructive approach. The tough question facing Washington after the most recent round of talks late last month is whether China will be even more helpful, or whether China has played all the cards it is likely to play to get the kind of cooperation Washington would like to see?

Fueling Beijing's uncharacteristically proactive approach over recent months is the fact that China has significant interests in ensuring that the United States and North Korea resolve the current situation peacefully. Regime change, or any approach which would precipitate the collapse of North Korea, either economically or politically, could potentially bring great instability to China. Waves of North Korean refugees would flood across the Yalu and Tumen rivers into northeastern China, joining an estimated 300,000 North Koreans already living there illegally.

Beijing also has compelling security interests in helping the two nations reach a peaceful accord. In return for the substantial economic assistance it has traditionally provided North Korea, China has received from its volatile neighbor a strategic buffer along its border. The crumbling of the North Korean regime would bring great uncertainty about the alignment of the successor government, an issue of significant national security for China.

Given these compelling reasons for involvement, why won't China do more — and do it more quickly — to get a resolution?

First of all, Beijing sees itself predominantly as a facilitator toward a diplomatic solution. China's foreign policy decisions have long been guided by a policy of noninterference and respect for the sovereignty of other nations, along with an opposition to "hegemony and power politics." It is only because China has such strong security interests that they have become involved. If they could avoid becoming involved, they would probably stay uninvolved.

Also limiting China's involvement is the strong belief in Beijing that pressure and isolation will only lead to a further lack of cooperation and even more provocation from Pyongyang, leading to the kinds of escalation and confrontation Beijing wants to avoid in the first place.

Finally, China is unwilling to pressure and debilitate North Korea for fear of domestic repercussions. Beyond some elements of China's political elite which increasingly harbor misgivings about relations with its troubling neighbor, many in China — both conservative leaders and in the wider populace — have strong political and emotional feelings in support of North Korea. This is particularly true among China's own Korean minority population, which, like many of their cousins in South Korea, opposes punitive measures against fellow Koreans in the North. Obviously too, it would be difficult indeed for the Communist regime in Beijing to help foster the downfall of another communist government, especially one just next door which has benefited from Chinese patronage for much of the past 50 years.

Given these interests and constraints for Beijing, how can Washington gain even greater assistance from China to bring the North Korean nuclear standoff closer to resolution? First, Washington should demonstrate a greater responsiveness to Chinese interests. It is a dangerous assumption to think that blindly pressuring China to play an even more involved role will necessarily be productive. By taking into account China's concerns — for instance offering possible refugee assistance — Washington could expect further cooperation from Beijing.

Second, Washington needs to clarify its intentions on the Korean Peninsula. Otherwise, Chinese policymakers are left with unhelpful assumptions and uncertainties about what the United States' longer-range intentions are vis-à-vis North Korea and on the Korean peninsula more broadly. To help assuage Chinese concerns, Washington must be more transparent and explain what actions by North Korea would precipitate the use of force.

As well, Washington needs to further convince China that the current crisis is not about U.S.-North Korean confrontation, but rather regional and global stability, issues in which China has a stake. Nuclear proliferation (with the possible repercussion of proliferation in places like Japan and Taiwan), terrorism and North Korea's exports of weapons, drugs and bogus currency, all threaten Chinese interests. The more Washington can help China see the North Korea crisis as a regional and global problem, the more Beijing can justify cooperation.

Of course, China's attitude could change. Further North Korean belligerence, such as the test firing of weapons or some kind of "demonstration" of its nuclear weapons status, could unequivocally alienate China. Given North Korea's confrontational diplomatic style, this seems a distinct possibility. But in the meantime, such a possibility argues all the more that Washington take steps now to secure even greater Chinese cooperation to confront North Korean provocations in the future.

Will Leahy is a history major from Chevy Chase, Md.