Iraq, Iran and North Korea: Not one 'axis of evil'

In his State of the Union Address, President Bush described Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil." Yet despite the similarities one often sees between these three regimes, great differences exist between them and the circumstances surrounding them. Thus, varied foreign policy approaches are required in dealing with them.

In Saddam's Bombmaker, Khidhir Hamza, a man who led Iraq's weapons program, documents Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's obsession for acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) over the past 30 years. Hamza notes that Saddam spent hundreds of billions of dollars on the project while ignoring key areas of infrastructure, tortured scientists who questioned his plans, and at times put himself in charge of the program because he felt the project was progressing too slowly. More ominously, Saddam was prepared to use nuclear missiles against Israel in the Gulf War. Hamza also states that Iraq is " very close" to having a functioning nuclear device and likely would have had one already had Saddam not invaded Kuwait. Given these circumstances, America must push for regime change in Iraq. Some argue for the continued containment of Iraq by strengthening sanctions against the Baathist regime as an alternative to overthrowing it. Yet, the UN sanctions regime has brought great suffering to the Iraqi people, which in turn spreads anti-American sentiment in the region. Sanctions have not weakened Saddam's grip on power and, as Hamza notes, they have not inhibited Iraq's development of WMD. Saddam has been able to generate revenue through smuggling and illegal oil sales. More importantly, containment offers no hope for a better future for the people of Iraq, who have suffered under Saddam's brutal dictatorship for over three decades. Proponents of sanctions argue that Saddam, not sanctions, are responsible for the deaths and suffering of the Iraqi people. Yet, this argument strengthens rather than weakens the case for regime change.

It has been argued that the United States and its allies should focus their efforts on getting UN weapons inspectors into Iraq as a way of thwarting Iraq's efforts to build WMD instead of pushing for regime change. UN inspectors, however, have been ineffective. Hamza notes that they were unaware of Iraq's successes in uranium enrichment and erroneously believed that Iraq's program never moved beyond basic research. Also, Saddam's death won't improve the situation as his likely successors, his sons Quasay and Uday, are known to be as tyrannical as their father.

Yet, Iraq isn't Afghanistan, and the Baathist regime isn't the Taliban. Saddam has a powerful security apparatus that includes 100,000 troops in the elite Republican Guard and even a larger amount in conventional forces. The Pentagon estimates that up to 100,000 troops may be required for an operation in Iraq. It is understandable that Washington may be reluctant to undertake such an operation due to the risks involved and the possibility of a large number of American casualties. Yet, at the very least, Washington could demonstrate its commitment to regime change by beginning to fund and train opposition groups, such as the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Unfortunately former President Bill Clinton opposed military training of the INC and the State Department stated to the INC in a memorandum on November 8 that, "the Department of State is not prepared to fund INC activities inside Iraq at this time."

Michael Eisenhardt, writing in The National Interest, asserts that a combination of American support for anti-Saddam radio and television propaganda, U.S. air strikes against Saddam's security organizations such as the Republican Guard and American help in mobilizing and organizing opposition forces and coordinating activates of the Shiites in the South and the Kurds in the North of Iraq offer great potential to overthrow the Baathist regime, without a large scale American invasion.

Iran presents a very different scenario. It has a democratically elected president and parliament, albeit constrained by unelected theocratic institutions. Iran is locked in a bitter power struggle between reformists, led by President Mohammed Khatami, who enjoy overwhelming popular support and seek to usher an era of increased personal freedom and democratization that has the potential to undermine the foundations of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the unpopular reactionary clerics led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who still wield power through unelected institutions and who are dedicated to maintaining the status quo. Bush's reference to Iran as a member of the "axis of evil" could not have been more pleasing to the reactionaries who have always sought belligerent relations with the US, while the reformists have favored reapproachement. The New York Times noted that Bush's reference to Iran as a member of the "axis of evil" has "bolstered old guard conservatives who seemed to be on the defensive."

Reformists in Iran see actions such as the recent shipment of arms to Palestine and support for terrorism as attempts to undermine US-Iran reapproachment. As The Economist writes, those who support such activities "are no friends of Mr. Khatami." The Economist also notes that, overall, Iran's behavior with regards to Afghanistan has been mostly constructive. Iran helped persuade Burhanuddin Rabbini to abandon his hopes for running the country and helped foster better relationships with Herat's self-appointed governor Ishmail Khan and the Karzai administration.

Dealing with Iran requires a subtle approach. America should open up dialogue with Iran and promote a moderate degree of US-Iran engagement to encourage the process of reform and leaders like Khatami, while simultaneously applying strong pressure on Iran to end its support for terrorism and improve its human rights record. Military actions and attempts to completely isolate Iran would have negative affects on the prospects for reform.

North Korea has long been seen as a "security threat" by American policymakers due to its proliferation of and development of WMD. Yet North Korea has repeatedly offered to end its development and proliferation of WMD in exchange for economic aid. It sees missile exports as a large source of revenue for its failing economy and famine-ridden nation. In the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its WMD program in exchange for relaxation of U.S. economic sanctions, aid, a supply of heavy fuel oil and "peacetime" nuclear reactors by 2003 (which are currently far behind schedule) that cannot be used for making WMD. Leon Sigal, writing in the American Prospect, notes that North Korea's tests of the No Dong and Tae Po Dong Missile were simply protests against Washington's failure to live up to the agreement. In October 2000, after a visit to North Korea by Madeline Albright, North Korea and the United States were on the verge of striking a conclusive deal to end North Korea's WMD program. Yet as the British newspaper, The Guardian, notes "those talks were abandoned by the Bush team so abruptly that it made observers wonder whether the souring of relations was intended to serve as a justification of National Missile Defense."

Bush's comments have sparked outrage in South Korea as many believe Bush's stance will spark a security crisis on the peninsula and undermine South Korean President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy, which has been successful in forging better relations with the North. Five South Korean members of Parliament sent a letter to the American Embassy on February 6 expressing disapproval of Bush's comments.

By examining the cases of Iraq, Iran and North Korea, one can see the flaws in Bush's worldview. He divides the world between "good" and "evil" where the "forces of evil" are united to destroy the "good guys" (failing to realize of course that Iran and Iraq are enemies). Such an approach is divorced from reality as it fails to recognize the inherent complexity of international relations and thus does not provide a pragmatic guide on how to deal with threats facing American national security. Arvin Bahl is from Edison, NJ. He can be reached at abahl@princeton.edu.