He cited Georgia as an example of the United States’ flawed approach to relations with Russia.
“Senator John McCain [R-Ariz.] proclaimed that ‘we are all Georgians,’ ” Bradley said, referencing the former presidential nominee’s response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia this past summer.
He added, “To that, I would respond, ‘No, senator, we are all Americans.’ ”
Bradley said McCain’s response, in addition to the Bush administration’s subsequently providing almost $2 billion in aid to Georgia, was part of a long chain of blunders in America’s relations with Russia.
“We can’t afford to be stuck on Cold War paradigms that make us automatically view Russia as an enemy,” he explained. “We need Russia.”
He said that Russia’s military action against Georgia was justified because Georgia’s attempts to foment separatism would set a dangerous precedent.
“Once the genie of U.S.-supported ethnic separatism comes out of the bottle, there is no telling what can happen,” Bradley noted, adding that the Russian map would resemble “Swiss cheese” if the country did not aggressively counter ethnic uprising.
He noted that numerous American administrations have not taken the best approach to relations with Russia.
Former president Bill Clinton, for example, failed to aid the Soviet Union after it collapsed in 1991 and faced a 1,500 percent inflation rate, a 50 percent drop in GDP and a dramatic decrease in male life expectancy to 57 years.
Instead of helping Russia, Bradley said, Clinton alienated it by expanding NATO eastward in 1993.
“Clinton rather incredibly argued that NATO would spread democracy,” Bradley explained. “Russia may not have understood this nuanced concept of diplomacy, but it definitely understood tanks on [its] borders.”
Bradley explained that Clinton’s action stemmed from the fact that “Russia was unimportant in the U.S.’ eyes: Its military was hollowed out, its economy was no larger than that of Denmark, and it was simply no longer a player in the market.”

Also at fault, he noted, was Russia itself.
“Even in the midst of its difficulties, Russia held [onto] the residual pride of a former superpower,” he said.
Bradley said that the United States should have instead tried to “win the hearts and minds” of Russia’s everyday citizens the way it did during its World War II Lend-Lease program, which provided more than $11 billion in aid to the Soviet Union.
Bradley noted that Russian goodwill toward America as a result of the Lend-Lease program evaporated after the “United States failed to do anything to help the Russians either directly or symbolically” following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
He noted that the United States should work with Russia on areas of mutual benefit, including combating nuclear proliferation, fighting Islamic terrorism and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear warhead.
“We can’t continue to fall prey to suicidal nationalism,” he said. “The knee-jerk bluster of past times will make our world a more dangerous place in which to live.”
Bradley finished the lecture by reading a letter he received a few years ago from a young Russian exchange student named Maria Sankova. He noted that the letter made him optimistic about the future of Russia-United States relations.
“America is not an enemy, just another place where people live and work and play and shout,” Sankova wrote.