Professors sound off on Putin's re-election, reforms

The Russian presidential race ended with Vladimir Putin's landslide victory on March 14, ending weeks of international media speculation surrounding several unprecedented events.

In early February a presidential candidate mysteriously disappeared and reappeared in Kiev, only to later drop out of the race.

On Feb. 24, Putin demonstrated his powers as current president by firing most of his cabinet, including Prime Minster Mikhail Kasyanov.

Early this March, dark-horse candidate and Putin's choice for new prime minister Mikhail Fradkov earned the approval of Parliament to replace Kasyanov.

Only a few days later, the structure of the new government was revealed, with the number of ministries reduced from 30 to 17 and many of them helmed by new ministers.

"Putin has majority support no matter what," visiting assistant professor of economics Sergei Guriev said, adding that "no checks or balances threaten Putin's absolute power over the government."

Putin's progress in streamlining the Russian government and stabilizing the economy since the financial catastrophe of 1998 has propelled him to immense popularity.

For many Russians, who would rather hedge their bets against instability than push for reform, Putin is just the right mix of progressivism and restraint.

Public confidence in Putin is further inflated by state-controlled news media, which usually portrays him in a purely positive light.

However, as Secretary of State Colin Powell recently remarked, democratization appears to be drastically lagging behind as Putin takes over the reigns of reform.

History professor Stephen Kotkin has also weighed in on the issue extensively.

In a March 5 Financial Times article, he wrote, "Here we encounter a paradox that extends back beyond the Soviet past: somehow the Russian executive must force through radical change while guaranteeing overall stability. So, to maintain power, Russia's popularly elected president resorts to nondemocratic methods."

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Putin's goals for reforming the economy during his second term include revising the tax system to siphon more money from the wealthy oligarchs through hiked taxes on oil production and exports.

His cabinet has until the end of April — when he appoints a new administration — to draft a new tax system, which could bring the economy one step closer to slashing the poverty rate and creating an economic basis for social reform.

The complexity underlying social reform is apparent in light of the corruption at all levels of civil services and bureaucracy, Guriev said.

For instance, to reform housing, policymakers will need to tackle several public monopolies and revamp the social transfers system.

Educational system reform may prove equally daunting, yet is perhaps just as necessary for overall progress.

To put the situation in perspective, the University's annual budget is roughly equivalent to Russia's yearly spending on higher education, Guriev said.

Reducing dependency on oil, breaking monopolies, boosting small business and reforming government bureaucracy also occupy high places on the to-do list.

Placing Fradkov at the helm of this new economic reform will grant Putin a great deal of power, several University professors noted.

"The appointment of Fradkov was pretty much a surprise to everyone," said politics professor Josh Tucker. "Most have interpreted this as a sign of Putin's increasing power in two ways. First, the fact that he could just pluck someone out of relative obscurity and make him prime minister shows how strong Putin is at this point in time."

Tucker also saidthat because Fradkov is seen as more of a "technocrat" than political figure, his appointment indicates that "important decisions" will be made by Putin and key cabinet members.

These other political players will likely include Dmitry Kozak, former first deputy chief of administration and the current chief of administration.

Putin's choice not to reappoint Kasyanov brings to an abrupt end a largely successful career.

Unlike Fradkov, Kasyanov was respected as an individual with a differentiated political agenda, Guriev said.

Guriev said he could point to two reasons why Putin would want to dismiss Kasyanov.

For one, Kasyonov doesn't belong to Putin's favored former KGB elite, and many believe Fradkov was a plainclothes KGB man, Guriev said.

Also, Kasyanov refused to concede unconditionally to Putin's denouncement of recently-incarcerated oil oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

If the long-delayed reshuffling of ministries and agencies signaled an end to Putin's fear of the bureaucracy, then the Khodorkovsky incident quelled all doubts that Putin has strengthened his leverage over the oligarchs.

"The oligarchs' association gave Putin a standing ovation at their last gathering soon after Putin landed Khodorkovsky, one of their own, in jail," Guriev said.

"Putin has managed to pit the oligarchs against each other," he added, noting that Putin can rely on public support for jailing oligarchs, since the public largely assumes they acquired their wealth illegitimately.

While the reforms of the 1990s have been "painful," the average voter is quite happy with the state of affairs, Guriev said. While the average Russian values stability, the future economic and political landscape of Russia is anything but decided.

"Given the strength of the pro-Putin forces in the Russian parliament, there is every reason to assume that any policy Putin wants to see adopted by the parliament and the government will in fact become policy," Tucker said. "Whether or not these policies will prove successful in addressing the problems . . . is of course another question."