Mercer County to replace paper ballots with voting machines

Mercer County will start using new electronic voting machines this spring, and critics have already voiced concerns about the switch from paper ballots.

The county recently bought Sequoia's AVC Advantage, a full-ballot screen with a similar display to the paper ballots used in Mercer County since 1952.

Computer science professor Edward Felten and others say these electronic voting machines need to be improved because they can be tampered and their vote totals cannot be independently verified — like with a recount.

A committee of Mercer County officials chose the product from a list of 19 possible machines that have been approved by the state attorney general.

The county committee further narrowed the list by examining the four electronic machines that are most commonly used across New Jersey, because the state legislature might require all New Jersey counties to use the same voting machine.

Dominque Magnolo, a member of the Mercer County committee that chose the machine, said the screens on the new machines show the candidate's name and party affiliation, just like the old ballots.

"That was one of the main reasons we chose the Sequoias, they allowed a full ballot, and all the voter has to do is touch next to the name of the candidate, and a green checkmark is made next to the person they voted for," Magnolo said.

Other factors the committee took into account were accessibility, ease of use, and rapid and accurate results, said Jack Mozloom, aide to the county clerk, who receives all the final votes.

"The Sequoias are very adaptable to people with disabilities. They move up and down unlike the paper ballot machines to assist those in wheel chairs, and they include audio devices to accommodate the hearing impaired," he said. "The machines are very user-friendly and easy to understand; you can change your vote and write-in names. Its electronic tally of the votes proves to be a lot quicker."

The AVC Advantage uses touch screen technology. Votes are coded and recorded on a cartridge that is similar to the hard drive of a computer. The cartridge can only be accessed through the back panel, which is sealed before the elections. After voting closes, the cartridge is delivered to the county clerk's office where the votes are decoded and printed.

However, Felten does not think the security requirements are adequate.

"The problem is that voters can't be sure that their votes will be counted correctly," Felten said. "Potential problems range from software bugs leading to miscounting of votes, to outright fraud through breaches of the machines' security." He noted that there are two safeguards that can help prevent election fraud that are not being employed by the AVC Advantage.

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"First, the system can create a voter-verifiable paper trail," he said. "One simple approach is to have the voter choose candidates on a touchscreen electronic device and then have the device print out a paper ballot that the voter could verify before dropping it into a traditional ballot box. Disputes or recounts could then be handled by examining the paper ballots."

A second option, Felten said, would be "the design of the technology, including any software code running in the machines, can be made available for public inspection. This will allow interested members of the public to evaluate the design for bugs or security holes."

Mozloom does not see much of a security threat in the new voting machines.

"The likelihood of tampering with the machine is very low because the cartridge can only be accessed from the back panel and is coded," he said. Magnolo expressed similar sentiments.

On their website, Sequoia describes the AVC Advantage as secure. "Vote processing via multiple independent data paths, are randomized and stored three different ways to assure absolute secrecy of the vote, absolute accuracy in vote counting, and absolute verifiability of results."

The debate over electronic voting has heated up over the last few months with an independent study of another electronic voting machine producer, Diebold, Inc. The study reported finding 26 critical weaknesses in their software. Diebold has since vowed to fix the machines in Maryland, but not the thousands used outside the state.

"The concern is that somebody, whether a voter, a poll worker, or an employee of the voting machine vendor, will be able to control the voting machine and thereby manipulate the vote totals. This is a complicated technology, with lots of security details that have to be gotten right, and the onus should be on the vendors to demonstrate that the machines are secure," Felten said. "When the public got access to the design details of Diebold voting machines, they turned out to have many severe security flaws. We don't know whether the Sequoia machines are equally vulnerable, but our general experience with security technology tells us that technologies that are this complicated, and that have not been subject to significant public scrutiny, are very likely to be flawed," he added.

Critics say another problem with electronic voting is the lack of public access to the software of the machines. They maintain that companies are using copyright laws to protect themselves from programmers finding faults in their software.

Democratic Rep. Rush Holt, who represents the Princeton area, has introduced legislation in Congress that addresses many of these concerns, including a requirement that electronic voting machines maintain the precautions that Felten described. Many Princeton professors have signed onto the resolution of VerifiedVoting.org that contain similar suggestions.